International research seminar on: “Managing Natural Resources in Statuses of Autonomy”

(Geneva, 4 June 2012)

**Wealth Sharing from Natural Resources:**

**Transferable Insights from Aceh**

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**Executive Summary**

This paper analyses the issue of wealth sharing from natural resources in the peace negotiations in Aceh with the objective to generate transferable insights for the Sahara peace process.[[1]](#footnote-1) These insights inform discussions around submissions by two peace process parties to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) on 11 April 2007 and 16 April 2007 respectively (UNSC 2007s, UNSC 2007b). The importance of wealth sharing for the Sahara peace process is that both submissions provide a starting point to identify potential common ground for discussions on natural resources and the environment (see Article 13, and Article 9.3, respectively). This potential has been underlined in the ninth round of informal talks reported on in the Secretary-General’s report of 5 April 2012, highlighting that the parties “confirmed their intention to provide the United Nations not only with focal points but also with all available information on natural resources and the state of the environment (UNSG 2012: 6).

The main objective of the paper is to explore the potential lessons of wealth sharing in Aceh for the “Moroccan Initiative for Negotiating an Autonomy Statute for the Sahara Region” so as to inform the deliberations on wealth sharing in the framework of the Sahara peace process.[[2]](#footnote-2) The paper focuses on two peace processes in Aceh. The first was facilitated by the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (CHD) (2000-2003), hereafter “the Geneva peace process”; the second by the Crisis Management Initiative (CMI) (2004-2005), hereafter “the Helsinki peace process”. Overall, wealth sharing was not a major issue in the peace processes even though oil and gas resources were major factors in the onset of the conflict. A substantive wealth-sharing regulation had been included in the government’s 2001 *Law on Special Autonomy for Aceh* (NAD) and featured in discussions on autonomy during the Geneva peace process. During the Helsinki peace process, wealth sharing was perceived as an area of agreement where no further concessions of discussions were necessary.

The main insights from the Aceh case are:

* ***RELEVANCE: A wealth-sharing agreement is less important if there is little wealth left to share***. The role of natural resources in the peace process must also be placed in the context of their overall importance at the time of negotiations. While in the 1970s they were a driver of the conflict and served as an important revenue source for the government in the 1980s and 1990s, by the next decade the declining resource pool and possible closure of production facilities reduced their relative importance. While wealth sharing remains an important symbolic achievement, in real economic terms it may result in little improvement of standards of living if not accompanied by measures that involve economic diversification, institutional innovation, and anti-corruption initiatives.
* ***OWNERSHIP: The process towards a wealth-sharing agreement must include a sufficient degree of ownership to be a meaningful conflict resolution effort.*** The NAD law failed to generate major traction in Aceh because it was conceived without any input from Acehnese stakeholders and was therefore devoid of local ownership. In Aceh, the law was perceived as yet another opportunity for corruption.
* ***CREDIBILITY: Wealth sharing must be embedded in a process that is perceived as credible by the other side.*** The government was unable to portray the NAD law as a credible option for peace. It did not provide any guarantees to implement the wealth-sharing provisions, and did not build any confidence, especially due to the multi-pronged strategy that ended in the 2003 military offensive.
* ***LEVEL OF DETAIL: The technical provisions must be detailed enough to make a meaningful difference on the ground.*** The wealth-sharing provisions contained in the NAD law suffered from a number of technical limitations. The law lacked baseline assessments on current and prospective resources, an institutional framework for revenue management, or territorial delimitations on wealth management authority.

The paper concludes by highlighting two transferable insights for the Sahara peace process. These relate to (a) shifting the ambition of secession towards improving the quality of life for the people, and (b) using natural resource management as a driver for socio-economic change. The paper has three parts. The first part reviews the background to the Aceh negotiations. The second part analyses the wealth-sharing component of the NAD law, and the third part explores transferable insights. The Conclusions include a series of practical lessons from peace mediators on income sharing from natural resources as an additional reference for the Moroccan Initiative.

**1. Background**

The 1974 discovery of natural gas in north-eastern Aceh was a central factor in the origin and evolution of Aceh’s civil war. Gas extraction intensified the government’s appropriation of revenues, contributed to Aceh’s economic decline, and resulted in an increased military presence in protection of the gas fields. Aceh became an important source of extra-budgetary financing for a military leadership that faced strong opposition from the new civilian regime after the end of Indonesia’s authoritarian rule. In addition, with the independence of East Timor in 2002 and secessionist and communal violence in other provinces, the military’s presence in Aceh became important to mark its traditional role as guarantor of Indonesia’s integrity, and its space in Indonesian politics. After nearly thirty years, all belligerents faced pressures that weakened their mobilization capacities, and these in turn fed an increasingly mutually hurting stalemate that ultimately fostered a readiness to engage in negotiations.

Aceh is Indonesia’s westernmost province and home of one of Asia’s longest civil wars. It started in 1976 as a small insurgency in the northern tip of Sumatra Island, and ended with the Helsinki MoU in 2005. Out of a population of about four million in 2005, 80 per cent are ethnically Acehnese and the largest minority (about 275,000 people) are Javanese. A census in 1990 established a population of 3.4 million in 1990. Population by 2004 was said to have grown to 4.2 million and after the estimated 166,000 to 234,000 dead through the tsunami, current population is estimated to be around 4 million. Nearly all of Aceh’s population is Muslim (Reid, 2006: 1, 4-5, 9; Gaillard *et al*., 2008: 516).

The conflict emerged as a function of resistance to centralization, economic exploitation, military repression, and impunity (Sukma, 2004: 3-6). Under Dutch colonial rule, Aceh enjoyed high levels of autonomy, which came to an end with Indonesia’s independence in 1949. President Ahmed Sukarno (1949-1967) and President Mohammed Suharto (1967-1998) centralized political power and control over economic resources. Under Suharto, this was especially seen with the “New Order” regime. This in turn alienated Acehnese and other populations from the central authorities (Nessen, 2006: 177-179). The discovery of natural gas in north eastern Aceh in 1971 led to a strengthening of the governments grip on power in Aceh. It established the Lhokseumawe Industrial Zone (LIZ) including investments by ExxonMobil, as well as permanent military bases for protection purposes. Despite these negative macro-economic impacts, the LIZ was generally welcome in Aceh. During construction, it created between 8,000 to 12,000 employment opportunities and about 5,000 to 6,000 at its peace of production. In addition, ExxonMobil build new roads, schools, medical facilities, and 4,000–5,000 new houses in an area with little pre-existing infrastructure (Ross, 2005: 41).

Throughout the 1980s, Aceh contributed between USD 2 billion to USD 3 billion annually in export earnings to Indonesian state coffers, comprising about 11 per cent of Indonesia’s national revenue (Robinson, 1998: 135; Sukma, 2004: 3). Prior to the discovery of gas, the economic situation in Aceh was relatively high in comparison to the rest of Indonesia (Ross, 2005: 38). During the 1980s, however, poverty rates more than doubled, while they fell in other provinces by nearly half. By 2000, Aceh’s regional GDP had risen to fourth place out of thirty provinces, yet it was the fifth poorest province of Indonesia (Brown, 2008: 263).

The issue of natural resources was closely related to the *Tentara Nasional Indonesia* (TNI - Indonesian Defence Force) and the evolution of military business. Under Sukarno and Suharto, the TNI developed into the guardian of the state and implemented successive centralization policies. The military justified the need for high expenditures and involvement in parallel military businesses by pointing to Indonesia as being a massive archipelago and the subsequent operational expenses this entailed (Burford, 2006: 3-5). This pattern of self-financing emerged during the Indonesian War of Independence (1945-1949) in which units relied on their own fundraising through voluntary support from civilians, smuggling, and taxation. These structures persisted in the 1950s and involved alliances between local businesses and the military that over time became institutionalized (Hendra, 2007: 118-220; HRW, 2006: 10-11).

The military presence in Aceh dates back to the discovery of natural gas, when it was deployed to protect the LIZ (Mietzner, 2006: 1-2). The province quickly became part of the TNI’s military business. While the TNI was engaged in mainly legitimate business in other parts of Indonesia, in Aceh its ventures focused on activities such as drugs, arms, and logging, as well as protection and extortion (ICG, 2001a: 12-13; Kingsbury and McCulloch, 2006: 213-218). Military businesses were also involved in construction, security services, robberies, and the illicit exploitation of plantations and forests. Aceh was one of the most profitable TNI postings due to the extensive opportunities for money making (HRW, 2006: 75). As a function of military business and in response to the insurgency, the TNI in Aceh developed into a military colossus. In 2000, it deployed about 30,000 personnel with an additional 13,000–15,000 police and special forces sent in 2003 (Schulze, 2006: 225, 247-248).

The *Gerakan Aceh Merdeka* (GAM **-** Free Aceh Movement)developed in parallel to the gas boom of the early 1970s and the subsequent deteriorating economic situation. The insurgency evolved from a small ideologically driven organization of about 70 intellectuals in 1976, to a sizable group including 2,000–3,000 regular fighters and 13,000–24,000 militia members, which claimed to control 80 per cent of Aceh in 2000 (Schulze, 2004: 4; Ross, 2005: 47). About 800 GAM fighters were trained in Libya during the 1980s (ICG, 2001a: 3). Due to the military imbalance, GAM pursued a strategy of attrition and aimed at increasing the costs of the “occupation of Aceh” through hit-and-run attacks. GAM also used its superior knowledge of the territory and population to counterbalance the TNI’s military strength (Schulze, 2006: 225, 229).

The Aceh conflict was accompanied by Indonesia’s political transition after the fall of Suharto. In 1999, President Abduharram Wahid set out to redefine centre-periphery relations through a referendum on independence in East Timor. He also took a referendum in Aceh into consideration but lacked the necessary support in parliament for such a step. When East Timor’s referendum supported secession, tensions increased in Aceh, which led to pro-independence demonstrations of about one million people (Ross, 2006: 45). In Jakarta, these processes split the ruling elite between those advocating a peaceful solution and the downsizing of military presence in Aceh, and others who simply wanted to crush GAM. In mid-2001, Wahid was succeeded by Vice-President Megawati Sokarnoputri who had a more solid backing from military elites. Thus, these elites re-established their political influence and soon after launched a military campaign intended to end the conflict in Aceh once and for all (Martin, 2006: 78)

Systematic attempts of negotiated settlements only evolved after the fall of Suharto. In 2000, the Geneva-based Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (CHD) led the first ever peace initiative between GAM and the government, leading to a *Humanitarian Pause* in 2000 and a ceasefire agreement in 2002. In Jakarta, however, the government was sharply criticized over what seemed to be an international recognition of GAM (Aspinall and Crouch, 2003: 16). In August of 2001, Sukarnoputri ratified the *Law on Special Autonomy for the Province Naggro Aceh Darussalam* (NAD), hereafter “the NAD law”. It was supposed to provide substantial local autonomy previewing a 70 per cent retainer for Aceh’s oil and gas revenues.

In October 2004, Sukarnoputri was succeeded as president by former General and Security Minister Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono who pledged to seek peace in Aceh. Under Yudhoyono, the government’s direction included back-channel negotiations as well as military and diplomatic pressure (Aspinall, 2005: 14-21). The continued crackdown had stretched the military’s resources and considerably weakened GAM. By late 2004, first contacts had taken place that culminated in the Helsinki peace process under the leadership of Martti Ahtisaari (Nessen, 2006: 194). Two days after formal invitations for the first official meetings had been sent, Indonesia was hit by the tsunami of 26 December 2004. The tsunami drastically changed the context of the peace process and catalyzed subsequent meetings of the Helsinki peace process (Gaillard *et al*., 2008: 511). Over a period of six months, GAM and government representatives agreed on the Helsinki MoU.

**2. Special Autonomy and Wealth Sharing**

This part looks at the role of economic issues in the Geneva and Helsinki peace processes, as well as the treatment of natural resource management as part of the NAD law. The Geneva peace process was paralleled by the government’s multi-pronged strategy of conflict management that included the NAD law (Aspinall, 2005: 23). The NAD Law framed the Geneva initiative and was part of a broader attempt by President Habibie to address Indonesia’s centre-periphery relations after decades of authoritarian and centralized rule. His government introduced the *Law on Regional Government* and the *Law on Fiscal Balance between the Central Government and the Regions* passed by Parliament on 23 April 1999 (Miller, 2006: 297).

Sukarnoputri ratified the NAD law with the intention to provide an alternative exit option for GAM out of the conflict. This option entailed unprecedented powers of self-governance and control over natural resources in exchange for the cessation of hostilities and the renunciation of independence (Miller, 2006: 301). The NAD law set out a series of provisions on, for example: the enforcement of aspects of Islamic law; direct elections of Acehnese regional representatives; and new institutions. A central aspect was that Aceh would receive 70 per cent of the revenues generated from Aceh’s rich oil and gas fields, with the remaining 30 per cent going to the central government. After an eight-year period, this share would be increased to 50 per cent. The government claimed that the special autonomy law was much more generous than previous legal provisions, allowing for an 80 per cent retainer from income deriving from natural gas, fishing, general mining and forestry (Department of Foreign Affairs Republic of Indonesia, 2001; ICG, 2001b: 6-10).

Even if engaging on paper, however, the NAD law had many weaknesses as a tool for conflict management. It failed to realistically address Aceh’s economic grievances and prospects, and most importantly, to build confidence in Aceh that the government was indeed committed to its implementation. The law neither included baseline assessments on economic reserves, nor specific modalities of revenue sharing. Moreover, no consideration was given to Aceh’s economic prospects once reserves would have been depleted (ICG, 2001b: 8). It was also unclear if the oil and gas revenues referred to the total production in the province, or simply to part of it (Martin, 2006: 82). In addition, the fact that revenue would first be collected by Jakarta and then be disbursed to local officials fuelled suspicions that payments were indented as political tools and would foster corruption (ICG, 2001b: 8). The uses of local administrations as revenue-management channels were also disregarded given their notorious corruption and lack of capacity to handle existing funds (Miller, 2006: 305).

It was then no wonder that the NAD law was received unfavourably in Aceh. The revenue-sharing provisions were perceived as a means to provide incumbent political elites with additional opportunities for corruption. Even if some government officials presented the NAD law as a flexible starting point, the complete omission of political representation, the reduction of Jakarta’s military presence, and investigations into past atrocities spanned the perception that the NAD law was a ploy (Aspinall and Crouch, 2003: 26). In addition, Jakarta also refused to provide any meaningful role to GAM and rejected the incorporation of its fighters into provincial police forces, thereby making it impossible for GAM to accept the regulations (Miller, 2006: 303). The law was conceived without any input by GAM or the Acehnese population and was therefore devoid of any ownership. Consequently, GAM rejected the NAD law, a decision that echoed a widespread lack of grassroots support and a prevailing mistrust against Jakarta (Miller, 2006: 304).

From the perspective of the government, however, the NAD Law was portrayed as a generous offer. This conviction of generosity reduced the government’s willingness to agree to any other concessions and increased the scope for the parliament and the TNI to pressure the government not to commit to any additional compromises (Huber, 2004: 47). The NAD law therefore limited the room to manoeuvre for the government and complicated its negotiation position.

However, the most serious flaw of the NAD law was that it was never really integrated into the Geneva peace process. A reason may be that, through the NAD law, the government had already signalled its willingness to share resources, and was therefore not able to negotiate much more on principle, even though technical aspects remained vague. Another flaw was that the law failed to ensure a buy-in from the TNI, and used revenue sharing as a tool to bridge the incompatibilities over Aceh’s status and the vested economic interests of the TNI in continuing conflict. Generally, the TNI agreed with the law, but only under the assumption that GAM would accept it as a final solution. Six months later, the TNI convinced Sukarnoputri to adopt a military strategy and create a new special military command for Aceh (Jemadu, 2006: 281). This was the death stroke for the NAD law and its provisions of wealth sharing. The TNI’s escalation of the conflict in 2003 undermined any belief in the good faith of the government’s offer of special autonomy.

It is important to note that natural resources nearly played no role during the Helsinki peace process, which focused especially on issues of self-governance. Economics issues and wealth sharing were not part of the core issues discussed in Finland, but rather a side issue. The third round of talks in April 2005 included the auditing revenues from natural resources, taxation, and the allocation of future resources. There was overall agreement on these issues as well as on the use of the Indonesian currency in Aceh. Not all members of the government delegation felt comfortable to leave Aceh with the capacity to raise loans, impose local taxes, and allocate resources. Nevertheless, consensus on economic issues could be maintained. Economic issues were even used to keep negotiations going after a deadlock on international monitoring (Kingsbury, 2006: 77-79, 98).

Part of the reason why economic issues were not contentious may be explained by their treatment in the NAD law. In a sense, the government had no reservations on the principle of wealth sharing because it had already been approved by parliament (Kingsbury, 2006: 104). Furthermore, oil and gas production in Aceh had peaked during the 1990s, production figures by this point were steadily declining and it was clear that oil and gas exploitation would be completed within the following decade (World Bank, 2008). The negotiations evolved around much smaller figures then they would have during the 1980s or 1990s.

**3. Transferable Insights**

Beyond the specific points raised in the executive summary, there are two main broader insights that flow from the Aceh case study. These relate to: (a) shifting the ambition of secession towards improving the quality of life for the people; and (b) using natural-resource management as a driver for socio-economic change. The section also draws on experience from the wealth-sharing negotiations in Sudan (North-South).

1. ***Shifting the Ambition of Secession towards Improving the Quality of Life for the People***

“After major operational and financial setbacks, the leadership’s optimism preceding the Geneva peace process had been replaced by a feeling that independence may no longer be feasible” (Aspinall, 2005: vii). In October 2004, GAM conducted internal discussions on practical solutions to end economic exploitation and political repression in Aceh. This led to a shift in objectives that allowed for renewed talks: “Assuming the goal was to improve the lives of the people of Aceh by altering their relationship with Jakarta, and not separatism for its own sake, it became possible to consider alternative approaches to ending the conflict” (Kingsbury 2006: 20). The breakthrough of the 2005 peace process then emerged based on the GAM’s acceptance of the notion of self-government in return for a degree of commitment by the government on security arrangements and international monitoring.

For the Sahara peace process, placing the discourse in the context of ‘improving the quality of life for the people living in the region’ may provide a useful overall framework within which wealth-sharing negotiations may be placed. This focus reduces the emphasis on separatism and independence and asks the broader questions about what status would realistically provide the best possible result for the improvement of welfare, development, and quality of life.

The governance formula proposed by Morocco in the context of current negotiations is indeed in line with this idea. As stipulated in its article 3, the Moroccan Initiative is “part of the endeavours made to build a modern, democratic society, based on the rule of law, collective and individual freedoms, and economic and social development. As such, it brings hope for a better future for the region’s population, puts an end to separation and exile, and promotes reconciliation” (UNSC 2007a: 2). Moreover, the Moroccan initiative provides for the control by the autonomous government over local administration, local police, education, cultural development, economic development, regional planning, tourism, investment, trade, public works and transportation, housing, health, sports, and social welfare. The autonomous government would also have a taxing authority to support these functions, while continuing to receive funding from the central budget as well.

1. ***Using Natural Resource Management as a Driver for Socio-Economic Change***

There is much opportunity to use the issue of natural resource management as a means to structure reform processes around socio-economic issues that are related to natural resources. An important element in such endeavours is on-going mediation support beyond a peace agreement.

When looking beyond Aceh for a moment, it was in the Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement (North-South) that the resolution of one problem (the sharing of income from oil) has led to a new problem (how to allocate and disburse the income). Transforming natural resources into income cannot be the only goal of a peace process unless this income nurtures economic development. However, it would be unrealistic to assume that the translation of income into development occurs without a political process. This process does not develop rapidly and by itself. There is therefore a need to strengthen a political process that creates a vision for a society and economy.

For the Sahara peace process, this means that any sustainable wealth-sharing arrangement must be accompanied by an inclusive political process, or institutional arrangements, that monitors the generation of wealth from natural resources, that mediates disputes around wealth sharing, and that ensures a broadly owned decision-making process to decide how the income from natural resources is utilised to foster development. As part of such a process, the Moroccan Initiative provides for guarantees in terms of financial resource allocation. Article 13 states:

The Sahara autonomous Region will have the financial resources required for its development in all areas. Resources will come, in particular, from:

* Taxes, duties and regional levies enacted by the Region’s competent authorities;
* Proceeds from the exploitation of natural resources allocated to the Region;
* The share of proceeds collected by the State from the exploitation of natural resources located in the Region;
* The necessary funds allocated in keeping with the principle of national solidarity;
* Proceeds from the Region’s assets. (UNSC 2007a: 3)

In terms of operationalizing the Moroccan Initiative in the field of wealth-sharing, Article 13 could provide an entry point into an inclusive political process that details a framework for income sharing and economic development. Such a framework should, for instance, be more specific about what is being shared and how. Part of these efforts would be a definition what constitutes ‘natural resources’. At present, the biggest natural resources are fish (esp. sardines, octopus and squid) and rock phosphates, with potential future nature resource to include oil, and strategic metals such as titanium or vanadium (Shelly, 2006; IFCD, 2010). A useful guiding definition can be the definition of ‘natural resources’ of the United Nations Environment Programme: “Natural resources are actual or potential sources of wealth that occur in a natural state, such as timber, water, fertile land, wildlife, minerals, metals, stones, and hydrocarbons” (UNEP 2009: 7).

What is more, there should be a clearer description of the modalities and governance of income sharing so as to increase to a maximum the transparency of transfers and control of resource flows. This can include, for example, a specific periodicity, authority over direct allocations, or specific management and decision-making provisions of a natural resource fund that uses natural resource revenues to strategically invest in economic and social development.

**Conclusions: Income Sharing from Natural Resources**

The following conclusions draw on a guidance note on income sharing from natural resources (Wennmann 2010). While not specifically related to the case of the Sahara peace process, the following guidance may inform the process design or the preparation of technical meetings on wealth sharing from natural resources. Key guidance points are:

1. ***Clearly define what is shared, and how:*** A clear understanding on the object and modalities of income sharing is important to prevent complications during the peace process. In Sudan, the government became more open to income sharing once it became clear that the proposed sharing formula would only apply to specific wells on the north-south border line, and not to all oil wells in Sudan. In this regard, Article 13 of the Moroccan Initiative provides for a entry point for a discussion of a broader framework of income sharing and economic governance (see also above).
2. **Keep negotiations flexible enough to allow resource ownership to remain unresolved if necessary, thus enabling future progress on revenue sharing:** Governments often emphasize the sovereign ownership of natural resources, while local communities insist that natural resources are part of their heritage. Agreeing on income sharing – but not insisting on ownership – can allow a process to move forward and the parties to keep face with their constituencies. Article 7 states that the Moroccan initiative “is made in an open spirit, aims to set the stage for dialogue and a negotiation process that would lead to a mutually acceptable political solution” (UNSC 2007: 2)
3. **Create information on natural resource wealth to level the playing field and manage expectations:** Information about the occurrence and value of natural resources is often unreliable after years of conflict. The parties can have hugely differing perceptions on the prospects and value of natural resources. The importance of natural resources within a conflict can change over time. Progressive resource depletion thus reduces their significance for future economic development. In the context of the case of the Sahara peace process, a joint effort to gather all existing analysis and information could contribute to crafting a joint vision about natural resources and their management. Efforts in this direction are underway as noted in the Secretary General’s report that the parties “confirmed their intention to provide the United Nations not only with focal points but also with all available information on natural resources and the state of the environment. This will permit experts from the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) to begin building a database as a foundation for future discussions on the state of the environment and natural resources, including an examination of the legal aspects of current exploitation” (UNSG 2012: 6)
4. **Negotiations on income sharing can alter relations between the parties:** Interests in revenue sharing can represent an incentive that overrides inter-group or personal animosities. In Sudan (North-South), oil represented an incentive for peace because major extraction and investments could not occur in a war context. Oil revenue incentives contributed to tactically informed choices to relocate the fighting from the battlefield to the negotiation table. For the Moroccan Initiative, Article 13, the negotiations on natural resources are an integral part of the overall negotiations aiming at reaching a political solution in the framework of an autonomy project.
5. **Having a good income-sharing agreement does not guarantee post-conflict economic recovery:** The positive long-term effects of income sharing are often undermined by other problems of war-to-peace transitions. These include, for example, implementation problems, a lack of security guarantees, or persistent distrust between former belligerents. Immediate conditions after peace agreements also differ and define how people and governments experience post-conflict transitions. In this context, every conflict has its own history and specific characteristics that require a tailor made inclusive, political process.

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1. This paper draws on Wennmann and Krause (2009); the conclusion on Wennmann (2010). Thanks go to Marc Finaud for comments on linking the Aceh case to the Moroccan Initiative. Please do not quote without the author’s permission. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. The terminology ‘Sahara region’ refers directly to the use of this term in the Moroccan Initiative and does not provide any judgement on other terminology in use as part of the Sahara peace process. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)